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TILTING AT INSIDER TRADING WINDMILLS 
MICHAEL C. MACCHIAROLA† 
In response to Jesse M. Fried, Insider Trading via the Corporation, 162 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 801 (2014). 
INTRODUCTION 
In Insider Trading via the Corporation,1 Professor Jesse M. Fried expresses 
his frustration that “when insiders are subject to strict trade-disclosure 
requirements and firms are not, insiders have a strong incentive to exploit 
the relatively lax trade-disclosure rules that apply to firms in order to 
engage in indirect insider trading.”2 Professor Fried divides insider trading 
into so-called “direct” and “indirect” styles.3 His Article does not concern 
the former—that is, the well-worn world of insiders trading their own 
shares.4 Instead, it examines a more circuitous brand—where corporate 
 
† Managing Director, Equinox Financial Solutions; Adjunct Professor, St. Francis College. 
M.B.A., 2001, Columbia Business School, Columbia University; J.D., 1997, New York University 
School of Law; A.B., 1994, College of the Holy Cross. This Response is a private publication of 
the author, expresses only the author’s views, and does not represent the views of any firm or any 
client or former client. The author wishes to thank Jake Hartman, Margaret Zhang and the entire 
staff of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online for their efforts in improving this 
Response. 
1 Jesse M. Fried, Insider Trading via the Corporation, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (2014). 
2 Id. at 804. 
3 Id. at 804-06. 
4 See, e.g., Jie Hu & Thomas H. Noe, The Insider Trading Debate, FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA 
ECON. REV., Fourth Quarter 1997, at 34, 34 (noting that “trading by officers, directors and other 
key employees of corporations who have access to private information has generated some of the 
most sensational scandals in the popular business press”); Audrey Strauss, Recent Insider Trading 
Jury Charges: ‘Possession’ vs. ‘Use,’ 246 N.Y. L.J. 5, 5 (2011) (observing that “[i]nsider trading 
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insiders maneuver the levers of the corporation to buy and sell shares at 
favorable prices and, in turn, boost the value of their own equity. Professor 
Fried views indirect insider trading as both costly to public investors and 
deleterious to the firm’s economic value.5 The Article also proposes to 
reduce these costs through the imposition of trade-disclosure rules which 
more closely mirror those applied to insiders themselves. 
This short Response aims to lend new insight and perspective to this 
topic, the importance of which cannot be overstated given the demonstrable 
increase in the number of corporate buybacks in recent years.6 The Re-
sponse proceeds in four parts. Part I simply recaps the Article, offering a 
synopsis of its main insights. Here, no improvement is sought. Instead, a 
summary and prioritization of the Article’s observations is the goal.7  
Part II asserts that the problem of insider trading via the corporation is 
overstated. As a foundational matter, incentive does not behavior make. 
More particularly, any personal benefit obtainable through indirect insider 
trading is significantly diluted, with an offender unlikely to hold a suffi-
ciently sizeable portion of the firm to make such behavior as desirable as the 
Article suggests. Additionally, the Article fails to address meaningfully the 
full cost of any iniquitous behavior when measured by the professional, 
legal, and reputational risk to which it subjects an unmasked offender.  
Part III focuses attention on the more benign (and more likely) rationale 
supporting firms’ stock issuance and repurchase choices. Regulatory and 
market distortions inspire corporate decisions surrounding open market 
repurchases (OMRs) and at the money sales (ATMs) of shares. In particu-
lar, the various accounting and corporate finance considerations described in 
this Part of the Response frequently encourage these transactions. Further, 
most often, decisions can be defended because they are in a firm’s interest, 
and therefore consistent with corporate insiders’ fiduciary duties. Regula-
tion of corporate repurchases is also far more robust than the Article 
concedes. As this Part suggests, any firm employing a responsible model of 
corporate governance routinely considers many concerns beyond those 
 
prosecutions have been back in the spotlight recently, with multiple trials and even more guilty 
pleas occurring over the last year in the Southern District of New York”). 
5 Fried, supra note 1, at 805, 826-33 (asserting that indirect insider trading “secretly redistrib-
utes value from public investors to insiders” and leads “insiders to waste economic resources”). 
6 See, e.g., Jason Zweig, Will Stock Buybacks Bite Back?, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 21, 2014, 5:19 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/03/21/will-stock-buybacks-bite-back/tab/print, archived at 
http://perma.cc/BF2-UJ9N (observing that corporations in the Russell 3000 repurchased $567.6 
billion worth of stock in 2013, representing a twenty-one percent increase over 2012). 
7 Admittedly, such an effort might not result in the same emphasis that Professor Fried would 
choose himself. 
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mentioned by Professor Fried. The final section of the Response offers a 
brief conclusion, positing that Professor Fried’s analysis rests on the 
tenuous assumption that the corporation and its officers are somehow 
inherently prone to malevolent action and self-dealing.  
I. PROFESSOR FRIED’S ARGUMENT AGAINST INDIRECT INSIDER 
TRADING 
Professor Fried objects to the frequency with which U.S. firms trade in 
their own shares while the trade disclosure requirements governing such 
transactions remain “minimal.”8 And though the Article highlights the 
relative laxity of the trade disclosure requirements imposed on U.S. firms 
compared to their overseas counterparts, its principal objection concerns the 
leniency of the rules that firms face in light of “those [rules] imposed on 
insiders of those firms.”9  
After applauding the long tradition of barring a corporation’s insiders 
from profiting freely as a result of their access to inside information about a 
firm,10 the Article questions whether regulations have failed to enforce 
similarly effective oversight on firms themselves (and on insiders acting 
through such firms).11 In Professor Fried’s judgment, “U.S. policymakers have 
failed to grasp that when insiders are subject to strict trade-disclosure 
requirements and firms are not, insiders have a strong incentive to exploit 
the relatively lax trade-disclosure rules that apply to firms in order to 
engage in indirect insider trading.”12  
In celebrating the regime that effectively holds insiders to account for 
their direct transactions, Professor Fried focuses on the requirements of (i) 
Rule 10b-513 and (ii) Section 16(a)14 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934 (“Exchange Act”).15 Rule 10b-5—one of the foundational parts of the 
federal securities laws16—requires certain persons who possess material 
nonpublic information about a firm to either (i) disclose that information or 
 
8 Fried, supra note 1, at 803. 
9 Id. at 803. 
10 Id. at 806-11. 
11 Id. at 812-17, 822-26. 
12 Id. at 804. 
13 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014). 
14 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (2012). 
15 Fried, supra note 1, at 808-11, 813-15. 
16 See, e.g., LARRY D. SODERQUIST & THERESA A. GABALDON, SECURITIES REGULA-
TION 398 (4th ed. 1999) (noting that “Rule 10b-5 clearly occupies the preeminent position among 
the anti-fraud provisions in the securities laws”); see also Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug 
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) (describing Rule 10b-5 as “a judicial oak which has grown from 
little more than a legislative acorn”). 
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(ii) refrain from trading in the firm’s shares.17 And Section 16(a) requires 
corporate officers, directors, and persons owning more than ten percent of a 
public company to disclose publicly the details of each purchase and sale of 
the firm’s shares within two business days.18  
With respect to Rule 10b-5, Professor Fried offers a two-part critique. 
First, he argues that the materiality limitation ensures that economic waste 
and unfair advantage will result from the rule’s inability to capture scenarios 
where inside information simply falls below that threshold.19 Second, he 
posits that deterrence is “far from perfect” where the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) has limited resources and, as a result, must pick its 
fights.20 The Article likewise criticizes Section 16(a) with the assertion that 
“insiders can trade secretly for two days without facing any price adjust-
ment due to trade disclosure.”21 Yet, without Section 16(a)’s disclosure 
requirements—however imperfect—Professor Fried concedes that “insiders’ 
ability to profit from trading on inside information would be far greater.”22  
 
17 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (barring insiders from failing “to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made [in a trade] . . . not misleading,” and forbidding inside trades 
that would “operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person”); Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 
911 (1961) (establishing the disclose-or-abstain rule); see also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 
642, 652 (1997) (holding that an insider’s fiduciary duty “gives rise to a duty to disclose or to 
abstain from trading” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Fried, supra note 1, at 813 (commenting 
that Rule 10b-5 requires insiders to “disclose any material nonpublic information that they possess 
or abstain from trading in the firm’s shares”). 
18 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a). 
19 Fried, supra note 1, at 808-09, 814 (“[T]he courts’ high materiality threshold permits trading 
on many types of important but sub-material information.”). Federal securities laws do not define 
the term “material,” but instead, rely on case law. Information is said to be material if “there is a 
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in [making an 
investment decision]” and it “would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.” TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
20 Fried, supra note 1, at 809-810. For a discussion of this principle in a larger context, see 
Michael C. Macchiarola, “Hallowed By History, but Not by Reason”: Judge Rakoff ’s Critique of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s Consent Judgment Practice, 16 CUNY L. REV. 51, 67-81 (2012). 
21 Fried, supra note 1, at 811. 
22 Id. Disappointingly, aside from a passing mention, the Article fails to discuss the “short-
swing profits rule” of Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act, one of the most important deterrents for 
company insiders transacting in firm shares. See id. at 830 (noting that Section 16(b) prohibits 
insiders from making short-swing profits by “buy[ing] and sell[ing] stock within a six-month 
period [when] the purchase price is lower than the sale price”). Section 16(b) thus is designed to 
prevent the unfair use of insider information by those most likely to regularly possess it, and 
provides for the automatic recapture of profits occurring within a period of less than six months. 
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b). In addition, Professor Fried fails to mention the ban on short sales by insiders, 
embodied in Section 16(c) of the Exchange Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (barring insider sales when 
the insider “does not own the security sold” or fails to deliver the sold security promptly). 
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Professor Fried is even less impressed with the regulation of firms dealing 
in their own shares, viewing the applicable requirements as far too lenient. 
The Article examines the buying and selling activities of public corporations 
and concludes that “[t]here is overwhelming evidence that insiders use 
private information to have firms secretly buy and sell their own shares at 
favorable prices.”23 With respect to both OMRs and ATMs, Professor 
Fried identifies three types of regulations applicable to firms transacting in 
their own shares: (1) pre-transaction disclosure requirements, (2) a prohibi-
tion on trading while in possession of material nonpublic information, and 
(3) post-transaction disclosure requirements.24 The Article objects to these 
regulations as being both too lenient and imprudent in their timing.25 
Professor Fried further complains that the pre-transaction announcement 
is at risk of subsequent amendment—because actual purchase or sale amounts 
are ultimately subject to change based on market conditions.26 Also, the Article 
laments that the post-transaction disclosure requirements do not obligate 
firms to describe certain important trade details and do not apply until 
months after a trade.27 
Professor Fried’s prescription and the Article’s raison d’etre is a proposed 
two-day disclosure rule (similar to the disclosures imposed on insiders through 
Section 16(a)) for firms trading in their own stock.28 The efficacy of this 
proposal, and of the analysis that undergirds the proposal, is examined below.  
II. INDIRECT INSIDER TRADING: AN OVERSTATED PROBLEM 
The Article fails to emphasize adequately the disincentive that counterbal-
ances any potential personal gain to an indirect insider trader. In fact, any 
such advantage is diluted by the percentage of the firm that such an indirect 
insider trader does not own. As a result, the Article overstates the tempta-
tion for any self-interested insider to manipulate the corporate levers in the 
manner Professor Fried fears. In fact, acknowledging shares not owned by 
an insider (and, in turn, fairly applying the resulting discount to any 
potential benefits of indirect insider trading) seriously curtails the desirabil-
ity of an indirect insider trading scheme. In addition, when the potential 
legal liability is measured against any budding benefit, the indirect form of 
 
23 Fried, supra note 1, at 839. But see Zweig, supra note 6 (noting that “companies tend to exhibit the 
same perverse timing—buying high and selling low—as individual and institutional investors”). 
24 Fried, supra note 1, at 812-15, 822-24.  
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 813, 822. 
27 Id. at 814-15, 823-24. 
28 Id. at 834-39. 
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insider trading seems far less appealing than the direct version.29 Applying 
simple risk–reward analysis reveals that the potential reward for direct 
insider trading far exceeds the comparable potential prize available from its 
indirect cousin. Further, comments about the differing reporting cycles 
notwithstanding, the legal risk remains the same in each case.30 Finally, too 
little consideration is paid to the contentions that (i) any benefit earned on 
the back of a selling shareholder is shared with all the firm’s remaining 
shareholders and (ii) incentives of this sort might not overcome the vigilance 
with which corporate insiders tend to perform their role as firm stewards.31 
A critical review of the very example that Professor Fried offers reveals 
the strained analysis required to equate indirect insider trading with direct 
insider trading, where an insider acts alone in the sale of his or her own 
shares. To support the claim that “insiders have an incentive to engage in 
bargain repurchases,” the Article constructs a scenario whereby a “bargain 
repurchase shifts value from public shareholders as a group to [the] Insider.”32 
In the simple hypothetical case presented, six shareholders each hold a 
single share of the corporation.33 The six shares represent all of the firm’s shares 
 
29 Professor Fried attempts to dismiss this concern in a very brief discussion toward the end 
of his Article. His analysis, limited to a paragraph, holds that an insider would prefer to act in the 
indirect manner because he could likely hide behind the liability of the corporation: “From an 
insider’s perspective, it is one thing for the corporation to be charged with a violation of the 
securities laws; it is quite another for the insider himself to be a defendant in an insider trading 
case.” Id. at 830. But cf. Robert H. Friedman, Jonathan H. Deblinger & Kenneth S. Mantel, 
Navigating Public Company Equity Buybacks, INSIGHTS, Dec. 2011, at 1, 1-2 (outlining the serious 
nature with which boards approach these transactions, because if they are handled poorly, they can 
“subject an issuer and its board to investor criticism, and, potentially, litigation”). 
30 Professor Fried draws attention to the fact that “a firm buying its own shares in the market 
is subject to much less stringent trade-disclosure requirements than a firm insider who personally 
buys those shares.” Fried, supra note 1, at 815. In particular, Professor Fried is concerned that 
insiders must report specific trade details within two days while firms “need to report only 
aggregate monthly or quarterly trading activity, and can wait for months after this activity to do 
so.” Id. at 839. Such analysis fails to acknowledge the fact that, in practice, the SEC, the Department 
of Justice and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) will easily gain access to any 
trading details that they wish to review. And the methods by which those trades are fully disclosed 
to other market participants is of little concern when it comes to the regulators’ mission to deter 
bad behavior. 
31 See, e.g., Friedman, Deblinger, & Mantel, supra note 29, at 1 (noting that “[b]efore 
establishing a buyback program, the underlying goals with respect to the program should be 
identified by the issuer’s management and board of directors and discussed at the board level”). 
The Article and this Response do not discuss issues of corporate or personal income taxation 
which, depending on individual facts and circumstances, would likely be significant considerations 
for any offending shareholder.  
32 Fried, supra note 1, at 817. 
33 Id. at 816. 
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outstanding and a single shareholder is deemed an insider.34 As the hypo-
thetical scenario unfolds, the firm repurchases its shares at a discounted 
price versus actual value.35 The insider does not participate as a selling 
shareholder “because he is aware that the stock is underpriced.”36 Following 
the repurchase (and because of the discount), Professor Fried asserts that 
stock value shifts from public shareholders as a group to the insider. 
The most significant issue with this hypothetical scenario is not that it is 
an overly simplistic example designed to prove a point. Nor is it the 
troubling leap embedded in the assumption that an insider has the wherewithal 
to identify and act upon an underpriced stock—all the while managing to 
skillfully manipulate the firm’s levers and manage the layers of checks and 
balances at the management and board levels of the firm.37 Instead, the 
scenario’s undoing is found in its expression of benefit, which seems little 
more than a sleight of hand. While the hypothetical insider enjoys a benefit 
from the offending discounted purchase, that very same benefit is available to 
every single member of the nonselling class of shareholders.38 So, while a 
selling shareholder in the example is hoodwinked into selling his stock too 
cheaply, it is the insider and all of the other nonselling shareholders who benefit 
from the scheme.  
By failing to highlight the fact that any benefit to a malevolent insider is 
substantially diluted by other nonsellers who ride the schemer’s coattails, 
Professor Fried overstates the insider’s incentive to engage in indirect 
insider trading. In fact, in the hypothetical Professor Fried presents, a full 
eighty percent of the economic benefit is enjoyed by shareholders other 





 Id. at 817. This statement is itself troubling because the concept of being “aware” of an 
underpriced security is at odds with the efficient market hypothesis’s central assertion that 
financial markets are “informationally efficient” and that, as a result, a security’s price impounds 
all available information. See generally Eugene F. Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, FIN. 
ANALYSTS J., Sept.–Oct. 1965, at 55, 56, reprinted in FIN. ANALYSTS J., Jan.–Feb. 1995, at 75, 76 
(“An ‘efficient’ market is defined as a market where there are large numbers of rational, profit-maximizers 
actively competing, with each trying to predict future market values of individual securities, and 
where important current information is almost freely available to all participants.”). For a 
description of the efficient market hypothesis and its limitations and applications, see Michael C. 
Macchiarola, Beware of Risk Everywhere: An Important Lesson from the Current Credit Crisis, 5 
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 267, 281-83 (2009). 
37 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
38 Professor Fried does present the insider’s benefit in Table 1 of the Article. Fried, supra note 
1, at 817 tbl.1. In the Article’s text, however, he draws little attention to the facts that (i) the ill-gotten 
benefit is spread among multiple selling shareholders and (ii) little of the benefit is enjoyed by the 
hypothetical malevolent actor. The objection here is against the Article’s emphasis.  
8 Macchiarola Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)9/10/2014 5:07 PM 
68 University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online [Vol. 163: 61 
 
any purchase of cheap stock or sale of overvalued stock significantly benefits 
the firm’s balance sheet and is thus wholly consistent with an insider’s 
fiduciary duty to protect the corporation’s interest.39  
Finally, if civil or criminal penalties and sanctions indeed represent the 
“menu of prices” that Jeremy Bentham long ago suggested, the indirect 
version of insider trading would seem a rather curious choice over the direct 
version for an insider opting to cross the insider trading Rubicon.40 Just 
how enticing is an indirect version of insider trading that requires an 
expenditure of insiders’ corporate political capital, all to manipulate the 
firm’s levers in favor of a purchase plan designed to shift value from 
unwitting selling shareholders to insiders? Besides, as the example illus-
trates, even if successful, any personal benefit derived from such a scheme 
arrives discounted by a significant dilutive tax, paid to other nonselling 
shareholders, which would not apply to the (much easier to accomplish) 
direct form of insider trading.41 Perhaps the indirect offender simply possesses 
a more pronounced instinct to share his ill-gotten gains with others. 
III. ALTERNATIVE FACTORS AFFECTING FIRMS’ STOCK ISSUANCE 
AND REPURCHASE CHOICES 
Professor Fried’s Article advances a narrative that OMRs systematically 
begin in the cunning mind of a self-interested insider and result in disad-
vantage for an unwitting selling shareholder. As a result, the Article 
underappreciates the far more benign reasons that firms regularly (and 
tactically) seek to purchase cheap stock.42 Most often, a corporation engages 
in repurchase activity to signal to the market that its shares are undervalued 
 
39 See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (explaining 
that “the board’s power to act derives from its fundamental duty and obligation to protect the 
corporate enterprise”). 
40 See generally BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS 105 (2011) 
(describing Jeremy Bentham’s philosophy, which extended “the economic rationality of pricing to 
the field of crime and punishment” and viewed “the penal code as a grand menu of prices”). 
Bentham saw humans engaged in a constant effort to weigh potential gains of any behavior against 
the pain likely to be imposed. Any rational punishment system must, under these assumptions, be 
graduated to allow for punishment to more closely match the crime. In this context, indirect 
insider trading’s lesser benefit, coupled with its similar potential punishment, makes it far less 
appealing than direct insider trading. 
41 Admittedly, this comparison assumes that the direct personal trade would be beyond the 
recapture of the short-swing profits rule. See supra note 22. 
42 The corollary holds true for ATMs. OMRs, however, are the focus of this section of the 
Response. 
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and represent a good investment.43 In fact, corporations seek routinely to 
improve the market’s perception of their earnings power by retiring shares, 
thereby improving the firm’s much-watched earnings per share ratio 
through the corresponding reduction of its outstanding share count.44 This 
benefit remains the most compelling reason for the corporation and its 
shareholders (including any shareholder-officers) to repurchase shares.45 
Corporations also engage in share repurchases (i) to minimize the dilutive 
effects of acquisitions or employee stock options, (ii) to distribute cash to 
shareholders in a tax-advantageous manner, (iii) to provide a measure of 
liquidity to minority investors, and (iv) to reduce the number of holders of 
record.46 That insiders might enjoy the spoils of these corporate benefits by 
virtue of their equity holdings is best understood as a secondary consequence.47  
 
43 See, e.g., David R. Fried, What to Look for in a Stock Repurchase Program, AAII J., May 1998, 
at 21, 22 (suggesting that companies use stock repurchase programs to signal to stockholders that 
“the stock is too cheap due to temporary conditions”). 
44 See STEVEN MARK LEVY, REGULATION OF SECURITIES: SEC ANSWER BOOK 11-41 
(3d ed. Supp. 2011) (“When a company buys back its shares, fewer shares are left in circulation, 
causing the amount of earnings per share to rise and (it is hoped) boosting the share price.”); Patti 
Domm, Buybacks Boost Earnings, as Valuations Rise, Profits Lag, CNBC.COM (Nov. 5, 2013, 12:47 
PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101160650, archived at http://perma.cc/Z735-HTFP (“A smaller 
float means less stock to divide the company’s net income by, resulting in higher earnings per 
share.”). Of course, as the name implies, the earnings per share ratio is determined from dividing 
the firm’s earnings by the number of shares outstanding. Less obvious is the fact that the corporate 
transaction by itself does nothing to affect the firm’s actual results. Often, however, investors are 
more impressed by perception than reality. See generally RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. 
MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 77-78 (11th ed. 2014) 
(discussing the earnings per share ratio and its inputs). 
45 See, e.g., Victoria Dickinson, Paul Kimmel & Terry Warfield, The Accounting and Market 
Consequences of Accelerated Share Repurchases, 17 REV. ACCT. STUD. 41, 42 (May 2010) (attributing 
the significant growth in accelerated share repurchases to the fact that “current accounting for 
these transactions . . . results in a more immediate . . . boost to reported earnings per share”); Jia 
Lynn Yang, Companies Turning Again to Stock Buybacks to Reward Shareholders, WASH. POST (Dec. 
15, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/ companies-turning-again-to-stock-
buybacks-to-reward-shareholders/2013/12/15/58a2e99c-4aef-11e3-9890-a1e0997fb0c0_story.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/WY4L-BSP9 (“When the number of shares outstanding falls, the value 
of each one goes up, instantly rewarding shareholders.”).  
46 See generally Friedman, Deblinger & Mantel, supra note 29, at 2 (articulating the various 
reasons for share repurchases). 
47 One practitioner expounds on the myriad alternative reasons for corporations’ stock repur-
chases: 
Corporations engage in stock repurchase programs for a variety of other legitimate 
reasons, including using the stock to meet the needs of employee benefit programs 
and the exercise of stock options; sending a message to the investment community 
that the stock is undervalued and a good investment; putting excess cash to use 
when there are no better investment alternatives; or reducing the cost of capital by 
substituting relatively cheaper debt for more expensive equity. 
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The Article’s greatest flaw is that its discussion about the regulation of 
OMRs is far from complete. Further, the description of the applicable 
regulations as “minimal”48 is incorrect. In presenting the appropriate 
considerations of a firm in connection with a share repurchase or secondary 
issuance, Professor Fried omits several key elements. In particular, the 
Article fails to articulate fully (i) the scope of the board deliberations 
predating such a transaction, (ii) the substantial and detailed restrictions 
about the time, place, and manner of share repurchases, and (iii) the full 
scope of disclosures before, during, and after these transactions. Absent a 
presentation of the broad panoply of checks and balances on the repurchasing 
corporation and its officers, the Article’s readers are more likely to overes-
timate the likelihood that the indirect brand of insider trading occurs with 
any frequency. 
First and foremost, the Article provides nary a mention of the internal 
governance and board deliberations and approvals that customarily accompany 
any corporate activity involving the firm’s shares. Corporations, as a matter 
of course, seek the advice and counsel of expert advisers, including bankers, 
lawyers, and accountants, to ensure that the best interests of shareholders 
are considered and that the board’s fiduciary duty is properly discharged in 
connection with any repurchase program.49 Among the factors that boards 
consider is “the impact of the repurchase on the cash position of the company . . . 
and whether there is a better alternative use of the company’s cash surplus.”50 
As a matter of regular practice, prior to approving any repurchase of 
firm shares, a responsible board would generally consider: (i) the relevant 
law of the firm’s state of incorporation, (ii) the firm’s organizational documents 
(including certificate of incorporation and bylaws), (iii) any existing agreements 
that limit the firm’s ability to repurchase (or sell) its securities, (iv) any 
 
LEVY, supra note 44, at 11-41; see also Peter Atkins, Questions Surrounding Share Repurchases, HARV. 
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 14, 2013, 9:35 AM), http://blogs.law.
harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/03/14/questions-surrounding-share-repurchases, archived at http://perma.cc/
K54T-B7Y6 (naming “returning capital to shareholders in a more tax-efficient manner than 
declaring dividends” and “offsetting the dilutive effect of merger and acquisition activity and 
exercises of employee stock options” as additional motivations for companies repurchasing shares). 
48 Fried, supra note 1, at 803. 
49 See Atkins, supra note 47 (“The board should discuss and document the goal of the repur-
chase. By doing so, the board can demonstrate that it properly considered its shareholders’ best 
interests and that it properly discharged its fiduciary duties.”). 
50 Id. Often, such considerations are required by the corporate laws in the firm’s state of incorpora-
tion. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2010 legislation) (prohibiting 
a corporation from dealing in its own shares “when the capital of the corporation is impaired or 
when such purchase or redemption would cause any impairment of the capital of the corporation”). 
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relevant stock exchange rules,51 and (v) the tax and accounting treatment of 
the proposed transaction(s).52 In addition, boards typically memorialize and 
document the nature and scope of their deliberations with care.53 
Immediately following a board’s decision to engage in a share repurchase 
program, the company’s attention turns to the public disclosure of the plan 
prior to its commencement. As a general matter, a public announcement 
intends to insulate the firm from potential liability and to inform the public 
about (i) the estimated time period of the program, (ii) the maximum 
number of shares to be purchased, (iii) the plan’s objective, and (iv) the 
manner in which the shares are expected to be purchased.54 
Because repurchase programs can influence the value of the stock, there 
exists significant potential to run afoul of the antimanipulation provisions of 
the federal securities laws.55 In particular, both Section 9(a) and Section 
10(b) of the Exchange Act prohibit fraudulent and manipulative practices in 
connection with an issuer’s purchase and sale of its securities.56  
In an effort to avoid potential liability under the Exchange Act, companies 
regularly conduct the purchase and sale of their securities in accordance 
with the prophylactic Rule 10b-18, which provides a nonexclusive safe 
harbor against allegations of market manipulation when the market activities 
of the firm respect the time, manner, volume, and price conditions of the 
 
51 In fairness, the Article does briefly consider NASDAQ Rule 5250(b)(1). See Fried, supra 
note 1, at 813 n.52. 
52 Atkins, supra note 47. 
53 See generally supra note 49 and accompanying text (highlighting how boards must document 
their deliberations to show that they have appropriately discharged their fiduciary duties). 
54 Atkins, supra note 47. This disclosure is typically achieved through a press release, or on 
Form 10-Q, Form 10-K, or Form 8-K. Id. Also, that a firm does commit to actually buying shares 
may be fueled less by a desire to manipulate purchases than a need to retain the flexibility to 
manage its fiduciary obligations to shareholders.  
55 LEVY, supra note 44, at 11-41. 
56 In pertinent part, Section 9(a)(2) makes it unlawful for any person  
[t]o effect, alone or with 1 or more other persons, a series of transactions in any security 
registered on a national securities exchange . . . creating actual or apparent active 
trading in such security, or raising or depressing the price of such security, for the 
purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others. 
15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (2012).  
And Section 10(b) makes it unlawful for any person 
[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered 
on a national securities exchange . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance 
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as necessary 
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 
Id. § 78j(b). 
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Rule.57 The Article’s analysis fails to account for the full effect of this Rule’s 
application on the activities of firms and their insiders. In fact, companies 
expend significant time and resources to ensure that transactions in firm 
shares fall within the Rule’s safe harbor, often entering “into an arrange-
ment with a broker or dealer that agrees to implement the repurchase 
program according to the companies’ instructions and in accordance with 
the requirements of Rule 10b-18.”58 Moreover, because the Rule aggregates 
firm purchases with those of affiliated purchasers, it invites additional 
corporate scrutiny of the personal purchases and sales of insiders.59 Again, 
the Article simply fails to recognize this reality. 
In 2000, the SEC was concerned about disparate rulings regarding the 
appropriate standard for a Rule 10b-5 violation60 and adopted Rule 10b5-1 to 
facilitate lawful trading by corporate insiders.61 The Rule provided that 
“knowing possession” of inside information rather than actual “use” of the 
information was grounds for an insider trading violation.62 At the same 
time, Rule 10b5-1 provided two separate affirmative defenses against 
liability for an insider buying or selling securities. The first defense applies 
both to individuals and entities buying or selling securities, and requires 
that the person asserting the defense prove the following three factors: 
(A) Before becoming aware of the inside information, the person had  
(1) Entered into a binding contract to purchase or sell the security,  
(2) Instructed another to purchase or sell the security for the instructing 
person’s account, or  
(3) Adopted a written plan for trading the securities; 
(B) The [relevant] contract, instruction, or plan . . .  
(1) Specified the [securities’ amount, price, and date];  
 
57 Atkins, supra note 47. 
58 Id. 
59 See id. (“It is . . . in a company’s best interest to be aware of its affiliated purchasers’ activi-
ties. . . . Even if a repurchase is made in accordance with Rule 10b-18, a company is not protected 
against other types of violations of the Exchange Act, such as [direct insider trading] violations . . . .”). 
60 See generally Allan Horwich, The Origin, Application, Validity, and Potential Misuse of Rule 
10b5-1, 62 BUS. LAW. 913, 914-915 (2007) (identifying Rule 10b5-1 as one of three rules the SEC 
adopted in 2000 “to address issues that arise in connection with the potential misuse of material 
nonpublic information in transactions in the stock of public companies”). 
61 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2014); see id. § 240.10b5-a(c) (listing affirmative defenses insiders 
can potentially use to avoid liability for insider trading). 
62 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) 
(explaining how Rule 10b5-1 deals with “the issue of when insider trading arises in connection with 
a trader’s ‘use’ or ‘knowing possession’ of material nonpublic information” by making an insider 
liable when he “purchases or sells while aware of the information” (emphasis added)). 
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(2) Included a written formula or algorithm for determining the [securi-
ties’ amount, price, and date]; or  
(3) Did not permit . . . subsequent influence over how, when, or wheth-
er to effect purchases or sales . . . ; and 
(C) The purchase or sale that occurred was pursuant to the contract, in-
struction, or plan.63  
Rule 10b5-1’s second affirmative defense is available only to entities that 
buy or sell securities, and provides that an entity may establish that its 
transaction is not “on the basis of ” material nonpublic information if  
(1) The individual making the investment decision [for the entity] was not 
aware of the information; and  
(2) The [entity] had implemented reasonable policies and procedures . . . to 
ensure that individuals making investment decisions would not violate [in-
sider trading] laws.64 
Since Rule 10b5-1’s passage, the Rule has generally been lauded “for 
providing a workable mechanism for insiders to diversify their portfolios 
without running afoul of the prohibition on trading on the basis of material 
nonpublic information.”65 Although corporations routinely manage transac-
tions in firm shares to avail themselves of the Rule’s affirmative defenses, 
the Article makes no mention of Rule 10b5-1 plans. 
In large measure, Sections 9(a) and 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rules 
10b-18 and 10b5-1 are familiar ground for those firms and insiders dealing in 
company shares, as they represent a large portion of the legal landscape that 
must be responsibly and carefully navigated. And, although their requirements 
might seem daunting, together they garner little mention in Insider Trading 
via the Corporation. Moreover, virtually no attention is paid to the signifi-
cant expense of time, energy, and monies routinely borne by responsible 
firms and their insiders endeavoring to purchase and sell firm shares 
properly.66 Against such a backdrop, the Article’s proposed two-day disclo-
sure rule for firms seems of little consequence.  
 
63 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1); see also LEVY, supra note 44, at 11-23 (summarizing the 
requirements of the first affirmative defense). 
64 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(2); see also LEVY, supra note 44, at 11-24 (summarizing the 
requirements of the second affirmative defense). 
65 Horwich, supra note 60, at 914-915. 
66 The Article’s omissions grow more significant when one considers that the Article does not 
address accelerated share repurchase programs, Regulation M, and the self-tender rules—all of 
which are beyond the scope of this Response.  
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CONCLUSION 
In the end, Professor Fried’s Insider Trading via the Corporation is tilting 
at windmills,67 seeking to solve a problem that is far from apparent. Along 
the way, the Article glosses over the panoply of regulation and best practices 
that typically provide checks on a firm’s purchase or sale of its own shares. 
Moreover, the Article is the product of an equally unfortunate and unwarranted 
skepticism concerning the nature of the corporation and its gatekeepers. 
While the Article does succeed in calling attention to an issue worthy of 
further monitoring, one only hopes that any ongoing reform efforts will 
carefully consider the more complete context and begin with a less jaded 
view of human nature. 
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67 For an exegesis of the phrase “tilting at windmills,” see Tilting at Windmills, THE PHRASE 
FINDER, http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/tilting-at-windmills.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/3FZD-8AXS. 
